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YOU CAN’T STOP WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE: 
COMPLEMENTARY RISK MITIGATION THROUGH 
COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE 
MATT REEDER* 
The end of man is knowledge, but there is one thing 
he can’t know. He can’t know whether knowledge 
will save him or kill him. He will be killed, all right, 
but he can’t know whether he is killed because of the 
knowledge which he has got or because of the 
knowledge which he hasn’t got and which if he had 
it, would save him. 
—Robert Penn Warren, All The King’s Men1 
ABSTRACT 
Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires regulators to help 
prevent the next financial crisis by monitoring executive compen-
sation arrangements to prevent them from becoming excessive or 
leading to “material financial loss.” A now-pending rule seeks to do 
just this. This Article argues that the rule is well-conceived inas-
much as it limits the total portion of compensation that can be based 
on risk-inducing incentives, ties incentive-based compensation to 
longer-term performance, places a ceiling on potential incentive-
based earnings, provides for downward adjustment and clawbacks, 
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1 ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING’S MEN 14 (2005). 
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prohibits many hedging behaviors, and institutionalizes gover-
nance mechanisms and oversight policies. But, by placing a num-
ber of scholars in conversation, the Article proposes a framework 
within which incentive-based compensation creates risk. Within this 
framework, the rule is insufficient to prevent systemic risk. Accord-
ingly, this Article proposes that regulators add to the rule a re-
quirement that companies disclose the full annualized value of key 
executives, subdivided and monetized into salary, benefits, incen-
tive pay, and perquisites. Doing so will allow market actors to make 
important qualitative judgements about corporate risk taking. 
This disclosure requirement will complement the proposed regula-
tory mechanisms and allow regulators to verify compliance ex post 
as market actors mitigate risk ex ante. 
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INTRODUCTION 
United States regulatory agencies have been tasked with pre-
venting the unknowable cause of the next financial crisis.2 Success is 
immeasurable because stopping ten crises and never facing another 
brings the same result: business as usual. Failure, on the other hand, 
could upend the global economy.3 Again.4 
To prevent future upheaval, regulators’ ex post analysis of the 
2008 crisis5 must correctly identify structural sources of risk to 
guide rulemaking that mitigates systemic risk ex ante.6 This Arti-
cle considers a now-pending rule that seeks to mitigate systemic risk 
arising from executive compensation arrangements.7 Section 956 
of the Dodd-Frank Act requires regulators to monitor executive8 
compensation arrangements to prevent them from becoming exces-
sive or from leading to “material financial loss.”9 The pending rule 
will mitigate some risk by limiting incentive-based pay by subjecting 
deferred compensation to downward adjustments and clawback 
provisions, by eliminating certain hedging behaviors, and by institu-
tionalizing certain corporate governance measures.10 However, 
                                                                                                            
2 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376–2223 (2010) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012)). 
3 See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvii, 117, 354, 389–90, 
397 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]. 
4 See generally id. 
5 The crisis is referred to in the Article as the “2008 crisis,” not because it began 
in or was limited to that year, but to denote that the crisis came to a head in that 
year, as demonstrated by the market crash. See, e.g., id. at 213–14, 256–353. 
6 See John H. Farrar & Louise Parsons, Globalisation, the Global Financial 
Crisis and the Reinvention of the State, 24 SING. ACAD. L. J. 367, 398 (2012). 
7 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37,670 (pro-
posed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 275, 303). This Article 
refers to this rule as the Re-Proposed Rule in the main text. 
8 This Article uses the word “executive” generically to stand in for the subset 
of employees in financial institutions who are entrusted with making decisions 
that put the firm’s well-being at risk. The Re-Proposed Rule effectively defines 
this group with its criteria for “covered persons.” Id. at 37,690. 
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 956, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1905–06 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5641 (2012)). 
10 The Re-Proposed Rule divides institutions into Level 1, Level 2, and Level 
3 institutions. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements at 37,684. All of the 
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the rule could better account for certain qualitative risks inherent 
in the corporate structure, including the risks that executives will 
continue bargaining for excessive salaries, that boards may not 
discipline risk-taking executives, and that corporations may offset 
deferred compensation in a way that minimizes its effect.11 To re-
duce these qualitative risks, this Article proposes mandating a ro-
bust disclosure requirement similar to some already in use by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission,12 to the recommendations of 
the 2010 Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies,13 
and to The Basel Committee’s Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements.14 
I.? BACKGROUND 
Before the end of 2008, several large U.S. investment banks 
faltered, some failed, and the financial consequences threatened 
to derail the global economy.15 These failures were the result of a 
series of unforeseen circumstances, and they caused considerable 
human suffering and outrage.16 The crisis caused 17 trillion dol-
lars in household wealth to disappear and raised unemployment 
                                                                                                            
rule’s requirements apply to Level 1 institutions, which have over $250 billion 
in average total consolidated assets. Id. at 37,685. The least stringent require-
ments apply to Level 3 institutions, which have average total consolidated as-
sets over one billion dollars but less than fifty billion dollars. Id. This Article 
considers the rule at its zenith, so focuses primarily on those requirements 
placed on Level 1 institutions. It is important to note, though, all of the major 
substantive requirements apply to all covered institutions. See id. Level 1 in-
stitutions are simply given more flexibility and less regulatory burden. See id. 
11 See generally id. 
12 See, e.g., Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 53,158, 53,224–25 (issued Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 
229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274); Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhance-
ments, 75 Fed. Reg. 9100 (corrected March 1, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 249); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2016) (as enacted). 
13 See 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395, 36,395–414 (issued June 25, 2010) (referred to 
as the “2010 Guidance” within this Article). 
14 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR REMUNERATION, July 2011, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs197 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/93ZM-M5FF] [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE, PILLAR 3]; 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISED PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR REMUNERATION (2015), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d309.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4YSF-RXFL] [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE, REVISED PILLAR 3]. 
15 See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xv–xvi, 233–56. 
16 See, e.g., id. at 3, 23, 353–402. 
 
246 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:241 
to over ten percent.17 In 2008 alone, there were over three million 
home foreclosures, “over two million Americans lost their homes,” 
and over 2.6 million people lost their jobs.18 By 2010, the Fed had 
provided banks an aggregate of over 19 trillion dollars in emer-
gency credit.19 Between 2007 and 2015, 518 U.S. banks failed.20 And 
yet, banking industry executives continued earning billions.21 In the 
last quarter of 2008, the same banking firms that were reporting 
multi-billion-dollar losses and borrowing money from taxpayers 
were also obligated by preexisting compensation arrangements to 
pay employees a composite total of around $18.5 billion in bonuses.22 
Reasonable minds pinpoint the crisis’s cause differently—both 
during its immediate aftermath, and in the academic and policy 
debates that have followed.23 However, the generally accepted 
narrative lays at least some of the blame at the feet of the same 
                                                                                                            
17 Id. at 389 (“Seventeen trillion dollars in household wealth evaporated within 
21 months, and reported unemployment hit 10.1% at its peak in October 2009.”). 
18 Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Secu-
rities, Federal Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-up Call for 
Reforming Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131, 132–33 (2009). 
19 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation is Needed to 
Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Mega-
banks, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 262 (2015). 
20 See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37,675 
(proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 275, 303). 
21 McClendon, supra note 18, at 134. 
22 Id. at 134–35 (“In 2008, New York City Wall Street Investment bank em-
ployees made approximately $18.5 billion in bonuses.... These [individual] 
multi-million dollar bonuses were primarily related to past MBS originations 
or sales that produced short-term corporate gains and were paid under existing 
contractual agreements, even though these financial institutions were report-
ing then-current multi-billion dollar quarterly and annual losses.”). 
23 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Com-
plexity, Causation, Law, and Judgement, 19 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L. J. 299, 299–351 
(2010) (arguing that complexity led to the crisis, and poses an insurmountable 
obstacle to regulators. He is “skeptical that regulation can eliminate objectionable 
levels of boom-and-bust.”); Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and 
Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1249 (2011) 
(“[I]t was the ‘big banks’—by funding the subprime lenders, buying their mort-
gages and securitizing them, slicing them to form CDOs and synthetic CDOs 
through derivatives, and leaning on the credit rating agencies to get AAA rat-
ings for junk—that were the primary cause of the financial crisis.”);?Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 375–76 (2008) (blaming “conflicts of interest, 
investor complacency, and overall complexity” which was exacerbated by greed). 
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banking executives who collected these bonuses.24 This consensus 
extends to conclude “that flawed incentive-based compensation 
practices in the financial industry were one of many factors contrib-
uting to the financial crisis[.]”25 Unsurprisingly, when Congress 
passed a financial reform bill in the wake of the crisis, it sought 
to curb incentive-based compensation.26 
In July 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act in direct response to the finan-
cial crisis.27 In its final form, the law runs to just under 850 pages 
and contains hundreds of sections.28 Section 956 of the Act required 
the regulators of jurisdiction29 jointly to pass “regulations or guide-
lines” by March of 2011 requiring financial institutions to disclose to 
regulators “the structures of all incentive-based compensation ar-
rangements offered” sufficient to determine whether compensation 
is (1) excessive or (2) “could lead to material financial loss[.]”30 
However, the law does not require institutions to report actual 
compensation of particular individuals and does not require com-
panies with less than one billion dollars in assets to comply.31 
Within one month of the statutory deadline, the regulatory 
agencies of jurisdiction issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
and solicited public comment.32 The rule had five key substantive 
features. First, it prohibited excessive compensation, as defined 
                                                                                                            
24 See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at xxv–xxvi, 417–19 (dissenting state-
ment). Other generally accepted causes included a credit bubble, a housing bubble, 
low interest rates, risky mortgage instruments, concentrated institutional risk, 
leverage and liquidity risk from reduced institutional capital, and contagion. Id. 
25 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37,674 
(citing FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 209, 279, 291, 343). 
26 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 956, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1905–06 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5641 (2012)). 
27 See generally id. 
28 See generally id. 
29 See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangement, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37,670–71. 
These agencies include the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Directors of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision, the National Credit Union Administration Board, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Id. 
30 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 956. 
31 Id. 
32 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170 (pro-
posed April 14, 2011) (referred to in the text as the “Proposed Rule”). 
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by the rule, through the use of incentive-based compensation that 
motivated excessive risk taking.33 Second, it prohibited institu-
tions from using incentive-based compensation arrangements that 
encouraged inappropriate risk of material financial loss.34 Third, 
it required institutions to establish appropriate compliance poli-
cies within a flexible framework.35 Fourth, it required annual re-
ports to regulators on the structure of existing incentive-based 
compensation plans.36 Finally, it required deferred compensation 
at some larger institutions.37 
The Proposed Rule received more than 10,000 comments.38 While 
most of the comments were form letters, the academic community 
contributed, too.39 These academics’ recommendations included: 
Adopting a corporate governance measure tied to stock owner-
ship by board members; regulating how deferred compensation 
is reduced at future payment dates; requiring covered institu-
tions’ executives to have “skin in the game” for the entire deferral 
period; and requiring disclosure of personal hedging transac-
tions rather than prohibiting them.40 
The institutional stakeholders also responded. They generally 
sought the issuance of guidelines rather than a rule, requested clari-
fication, and argued that the scope of the 2011 rule was too broad 
                                                                                                            
33 Id. at 21,178. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 21,179–80, 21,183. 
36 Id. at 21,172, 21,184. 
37 Id. at 21,180–83. 
38 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37,670, 37,677 
(proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 275, 303). 
39 Id. The form letters fell into two categories: (1) advocating for minimizing 
“the incentives for short-term risk-taking by executives by requiring at least a 
five-year deferral period for executive bonuses at big banks, banning execu-
tives’ hedging of their pay packages, and requiring specific details from banks 
on precisely how they ensure that executives will share in the long-term risks” 
or (2) claiming to be from someone affected by the financial crisis and in favor 
of measures such as “basing incentive-based compensation on measures of a 
financial institution’s safety and stability, such as the institution’s bond price 
or the spread on credit default swaps.” Id. Other commenters encouraged 
measures including strengthening the rule, revising certain definitions, increasing 
the deferral period for incentive-based compensation, including more data in 
annual reports on incentive-based compensation, and “public reporting by the 
Agencies of information quantifying the overall sensitivity of incentive-based 
compensation to long-term risks at major financial institutions[.]” Id. 
40 Id. 
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(either in terms of which institutions would be covered or which 
employees within those institutions would be covered).41 Further: 
Many of these [institutional] commenters also opposed the 
2011 Proposed Rule’s mandatory deferral provision, and some 
asserted that the provision was unsupported by empirical evi-
dence and potentially harmful to a covered institution’s ability 
to attract and retain key employees. In addition, many of these 
commenters asserted that the material risk-taker provision in 
the 2011 Proposed Rule was unclear or imposed on the boards 
of directors of covered institutions duties more appropriately 
undertaken by the institutions’ management. Finally, these 
commenters expressed concerns about the burden and timing 
of the 2011 Proposed Rule.42 
No final rule was issued. 
On June 10, 2016, the rule was re-proposed in a 170-page entry in 
the Federal Register.43 The comment period closed on July 22, 2016. 
While the Re-Proposed Rule largely matches—but expounds upon— 
the 2011 rule, it does include changes that purport to account for a 
number of developments in regulatory practice since 2011.44 Nota-
ble changes include: a shorter deferral period for incentive-based 
                                                                                                            
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 37,670. 
44 Id. at 37,673, 37,679 (“Since the 2011 Proposed Rule was published, 
incentive-based compensation practices have evolved in the financial services 
industry. The Board, the OCC, and the FDIC have gained experience in ap-
plying guidance on incentive-based compensation, FHFA has gained super-
visory experience in applying compensation-related rules adopted under the 
authority of the Safety and Soundness Act, and foreign jurisdictions have 
adopted incentive-based compensation remuneration codes, regulations, and 
guidance. In light of these developments and the comments received on the 
2011 Proposed Rule, the Agencies are publishing a new proposed rule to im-
plement section 956.... [T]he proposed rule reflects the Agencies’ collective 
supervisory experiences since they proposed the 2011 Proposed Rule. These 
supervisory experiences, which are described above, have allowed the Agencies 
to propose a rule that incorporates practices that financial institutions and for-
eign regulators have adopted to address the deficiencies in incentive-based 
compensation practices that helped contribute to the financial crisis that began 
in 2007. For that reason, the proposed rule differs in some respects from the 
2011 Proposed Rule.”). 
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compensation, an added clawback provision for referred compen-
sation, and a record-keeping requirement in place of the annual 
incentive-based compensation reporting requirement.45 
The 2011 Proposed Rule sought to lower the chances of future 
crises by curtailing the excessive risk-taking behaviors encouraged 
by executive compensation arrangements.46 The Re-Proposed Rule 
improves on these efforts, but it could do more with an added com-
pensation disclosure requirement.47 To understand why such an 
added requirement is needed, I turn now to the theoretical frame-
work within which the problem of excessive executive compensa-
tion arises. 
II.?THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION 
Executive compensation contributed to the financial crisis by 
incentivizing—but not penalizing—corporate risk taking.48 The 
high demand for housing created market risk.49 The practices of 
mortgage brokers were based on faulty assumptions about the 
                                                                                                            
45 Id. at 37,680–81 (“The 2011 Proposed Rule contained an annual reporting 
requirement, which has been replaced by a recordkeeping requirement.... Un-
like the 2011 Proposed Rule, the proposed rule would explicitly require a shorter 
deferral period for incentive-based compensation awarded under a long-term 
incentive plan.... [T]he proposed rule would require a Level 1 or Level 2 covered 
institution to include clawback provisions in the incentive-based compensation 
arrangements.... The 2011 Proposed Rule did not include a clawback requirement.”). 
46 See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170 
(proposed April 24, 2011). 
47 See generally Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37,670. 
48 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, INCENTIVE COMPEN-
SATION PRACTICES: A REPORT ON THE HORIZONTAL REVIEW OF PRACTICES AT 
LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2011) (concluding that “[r]isk-taking incen-
tives provided by incentive compensation arrangements in the financial ser-
vices industry were a contributing factor to the financial crisis that began in 
2007.”) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE]; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, 
at xvii (concluding that the crisis could have been avoided, but “[t]he captains of 
finance and the public stewards of our financial system ignored warnings and 
failed to question, understand, and manage evolving risks within a system es-
sential to the well-being of the American public.”). 
49 See, e.g., Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. Real 
Estate Market Collapse, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 927 (citing Gilbert Burck, 
A New Kind of Stock Market, FORTUNE, Mar. 1959, at 120, 201 (quoting Alan 
Greenspan discussing how high demand leads to high prices, which could re-
sult in disaster)). 
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market, which created risk.50 Many realtors and appraisers were 
drawn into the cycle by what they perceived as competitive business 
practices.51 As homes were valued and mortgaged, and individual 
mortgage instruments were bundled, rated, sold, and securitized, 
the risk spread from individual loans to the entire system.52 The 
market risk of one overvalued house, owned by an over-leveraged 
and undercapitalized family with a single subprime mortgage was 
multiplied when it was bundled with similarly risky mortgages in 
security instruments or collateralized debt obligations which 
were fully financialized in the form of credit default swaps; risk 
was added to risk.53 But the managers and executives with the 
information and sophistication to identify and mitigate these risks 
did not break the cycle.54 Instead, they seized on these risky trans-
actions to increase their own income.55 The structure of their com-
pensation arrangements—which in 2008 ultimately externalized 
market risk to American taxpayers—incentivized their seemingly 
reckless behavior.56 
                                                                                                            
50 See, e.g., id. at 949–50, n.145 (discussing the recklessness in the primary 
mortgage market and citing to a statement from the president of the Mortgage 
Brokers Association for Responsible Lending in which his organization found 
that within a small sample of mortgage applications, 60 percent of applicants 
overstated household income by over 50 percent). 
51 See, e.g., Mary Szto, Real Estate Agents as Agents of Social Change: Red-
lining, Reverse Redlining, and Greenlining, 12 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1, 42 (fo-
cusing on the systemic racism in historical practices of realtors, specifically 
discussing “steering” during the housing bubble, which led the Realtor’s asso-
ciation in 2006 to begin “a multi-million dollar media campaign ... to ... convince 
[buyers] that it was a great time to buy” and providing realtors in its magazine 
publication “scripts for dealing with clients worried about the advisability of 
buying in a down market[,]” concluding that “[m]any mortgage companies were 
‘captive lenders’ of the real estate agents.”) (internal quotations omitted); see 
also J. Kevin Murray, Issues In Appraisal Regulation: The Cracks in the Foun-
dation of the Mortgage Lending Process, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1301, 1309–18 
(2010) (discussing the ease with which appraisals can be inaccurate, and the 
negative effect that even a small number of unscrupulous appraisers can have 
within a local market). 
52 See Boyack, supra note 49, at 941–42, 946–47. 
53 See Murray, supra note 51, at 1312 (discussing the overpricing of homes 
by appraisers); Boyack, supra note 49, at 950 n.145 (discussing the lack of ac-
curate reporting of income on subprime loans). 
54 See Boyack, supra note 49, at 964. 
55 Id. 
56 See FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 48, at 1. 
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Managers’ and executives’ own pecuniary interests, which in 
some cases eclipsed their obligations to corporate shareholders 
and the public, left banking industry executives standing in the 
rubble of the U.S. financial markets in 2008 holding $18.4 billion 
in bonuses.57 This scene was the natural consequence of an orga-
nizational structure that separates the functions of firm ownership 
and firm control.58 Put simply, firm owners want to maximize the 
market value of their firms, while agents (non-owners who control 
firms) want to maximize present compensation and their power 
to leverage firms to increase future compensation.59 Because of 
this conflict, a firm owner must spend money and effort to ensure 
that the agent is acting in the firm’s best interest.60 The costs of 
aligning these interests are “agency costs,”61 and controlling these 
costs is a principle function of corporate law.62 The compensation 
arrangements that rewarded the excessive risk taking that led to 
the 2008 crisis resulted directly from these agency costs.63 
                                                                                                            
57 Ben White, What Red Ink? Wall Street Paid Hefty Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/business/29bonus.html?ref 
=business [https://perma.cc/9QGQ-22Y7]. 
58 See JOHN ARMOUR, HENRY HANSMANN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, HARVARD 
JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS, DISCUSSION PAPER 
NO. 644, AGENCY PROBLEMS, LEGAL STRATEGIES AND ENFORCEMENT 2 (2009). 
59 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 16 (2004). 
60 See id. at 17. 
61 A full exploration of agency costs would require a scope and expertise exceed-
ing that of this Article. Agency theory combines work in economics, property rights, 
finance, and behavioral theory. For a helpful overview of the effects of agency 
costs on the corporate structure, see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 7 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993). Jen-
sen and Meckling define agency costs as “the sum of: 1. the monitoring expend-
itures by the principal [including ‘efforts ... to “control” the behavior of the agent 
through budget restrictions, compensation policies [and] operating rules ...’ ] 2. 
the bonding expenditures by the agent, [and] 3. the residual loss.” Id. at 7 n.1. 
62 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 58, at 2 (pointing out that one of the two 
general functions of corporate law is to attempt “to control conflicts of interest 
among corporate constituencies, including those between corporate ‘insiders,’ 
such as controlling shareholders and top managers, and ‘outsiders,’ such as 
minority shareholders or creditors”). 
63 See Richard Posner, Essay, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, 
What if Anything Should be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L. J. 1013, 1029 (2009). 
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In a corporation, the board of directors sets and monitors ex-
ecutives’ salaries.64 Seeking to resolve the conflicting interests of 
shareholders and executives, boards tie pay to pre-determined 
performance measures to better align executive decision making 
with shareholder interests.65 However, this introduces uncertainty in 
the executives’ pay arrangement, which justifies a demand for 
higher pay as a counterbalance. Directors can rationalize this higher 
pay to shareholders by focusing on the cost of the salary, without 
considering the cost of the added risk.66 Since the variability should, 
in theory, guarantee that large payouts are only in exchange for 
good performance, the added rents of an excessive payout are like 
a “success tax,” the effect of which is dispersed across all share-
holders. In contrast, when fixed pay makes up most of an executive’s 
salary, shareholders pay too much for poor performance.67 To fur-
ther soften the impact of poor performance, executives engage in 
hedging behaviors like negotiating for large severance packages 
known colloquially as “golden parachutes.”68 
Shareholder monitoring, the primary check on this demand for 
higher wages, can be ineffective because many directors do not bar-
gain with executives at arm’s length; directors face social and psy-
chological pressures to favor a well-liked and powerful executive.69 
Outside consultants, hoping to be rehired by an executive, give advice 
that pushes salaries still higher.70 Many board members are them-
selves executives at other firms, so they have their own interest in 
keeping executive pay high.71 The resulting compensation arrange-
ments mean that “there is no ceiling on the potential gain, but the 
loss is truncated at the value of the options” for an executive, which 
                                                                                                            
64 See, e.g., BRUCE R. ELLIG, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE COMPEN-
SATION 592–93 (McGraw-Hill 2007). 
65 Id. at 41–42, 69–75. 
66 See id. at 542 (“Reward should be in proportion to risk. The greater the 
risk, the greater the possible reward. This is the underlying principle of variable 
pay and pay for performance.”). 
67 Id. at 535 (“The absence of incentive pay is the most expensive to the 
organization for poor performers (because of fixed pay) and the least expensive 
for good performers (again because of fixed pay).”). 
68 Id. at 235–42. 
69 See BEBCHUCK & FRIED, supra note 59, at 31–32. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 33 (citing a 2002 survey that found that 41 percent of directors on 
compensation committees were executives, and of the 26 percent of board mem-
bers who were retirees, most were former executives). 
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a golden parachute further mitigates.72 The net effect is of “[i]ncen-
tivizing the CEO to take risk, while at the same time cushioning him 
from the consequences of loss[,]” which is similar to the “mistake 
that led to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.”73 Ultimately: 
The greater [an executive’s] compensation is, and the closer it 
is tied to the price of his corporation’s stock, the greater his 
incentive to maximize short-run profits. The compensation he 
can earn in the short run provides a form of insurance against 
the consequences of mistiming the bubble and failing to jump 
off it before it bursts, as does a generous severance package.74 
Additionally, because short-run corporate profits are more easily 
manipulated than long-run profits, such compensation arrangements 
can create incentives to engage in behaviors that hide information, 
manipulate fluctuations in stock prices, inflate the apparent value 
of a corporation, and ignore generally accepted auditing standards 
and best practices.75 
However, these behaviors have a limit. Bebchuck and Fried 
coined the term “outrage costs” to describe the negative reactions of 
members of the public who become aware of large executive compen-
sation arrangements.76 These costs are the financial consequences of 
the reputational damage a firm suffers when the media and the pub-
lic react to the appearance of cronyism, insider dealing, and cor-
ruption.77 The Occupy Wall Street movement is an extreme example 
of this phenomenon,78 and Senator Bernie Sanders’s presidential 
campaign represented its national and mainstream politicization.79 
                                                                                                            
72 Posner, supra note 63, at 1026–27 (citing Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald 
C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of CEO Stock Options on 
Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1055, 1063 (2007)). 
73 Id. at 1027. 
74 Id. at 1041. 
75 Id. at 1039–40. 
76 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 59, at 64–66. 
77 Id. at 65–66. 
78 See, e.g., Sandra D. Jordan, Victimization on Main Street: Occupy Wall Street 
and the Mortgage Fraud Crisis, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485, 486, 491, 494 (2011) 
(explaining the Occupy Wall Street movement as a Marxist backlash against 
the perception that plutocratic power structures in the U.S. allowed perpetra-
tors of fraud to precipitate the 2008 financial crisis and get away with it). 
79 Gregory Krieg, Occupy Wall Street Rises up for Sanders, CNN (April 13, 
2016, 1:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/13/politics/occupy-wall-street-bernie 
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Regardless of how an executive secures a compensation award, once 
that award crosses a certain threshold, informed shareholders and 
an informed public will react.80 When the reaction is widespread 
and forceful, it exercises an “outrage constraint” to curb corporate 
compensation policies.81 It is, therefore, in the pecuniary interest 
of executives to prevent this outrage.82 To do so, some have employed 
creative techniques to camouflage or legitimize their compensation 
arrangements.83 These techniques include deferred compensation 
plans, using consultants with conflicting interests to justify in-
creased compensation, and novel retirement arrangements, such 
as retirement perquisites (like sports tickets, chauffeured cars, 
corporate aircraft, or guaranteed consulting contracts) and corporate 
loans with favorable interest rates, which are sometimes forgiven 
completely.84 Executives’ ingenuity in negotiating and crafting ways 
to camouflage compensation seems boundless. 
As Richard Posner points out, these behaviors stemming from 
agency costs fall on a spectrum.85 Excessive compensation schemes 
are near one end of this spectrum, and criminal and fraudulent 
behaviors are at the other.86 At the criminal end of this spectrum 
is what Christina Paragon Skinner has called “misconduct risk,” 
which she defines as “the intentional distortion of information 
                                                                                                            
-sanders-new-york-primary/ [https://perma.cc/V2S8-HNAJ]. In December 2011, 
Senator Sanders introduced the OCCUPIED (Outlawing Corporate Cash Un-
dermining the Public Interest in our Elections and Democracy) Resolution, 
which was directly inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement and which 
would have amended the U.S. Constitution to overturn Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2008), and which would prohibit cor-
porate campaign spending. See Ashley Mushnick, Senator Sanders Files Deutch 
Amendment to Ban Corporate Spending in Elections in U.S. Senate (Dec. 8, 
2011), http://teddeutch.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=271 
767 [https://perma.cc/6TLE-Q8V4]; see also S.J. Res. 33, 112th Cong. (2011). 
80 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 59, at 5. 
81 See Harrell Wells, “No Man can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight 
Over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 762 
(2010) (explaining the sweeping effects of public backlash over excessive exec-
utive compensation in the years leading up to the Great Depression). 
82 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 59, at 65. 
83 Id. at 67–68. 
84 Id. at 70–71, 105–10, 112–14. 
85 Posner, supra note 63, at 1038–40. 
86 Id. 
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that, when aggregated and synchronized across institutions, un-
dermines market safety and soundness.”87 Her framework consists 
of three key features, which create systemic risk by “operat[ing] 
in tandem as a misconduct contagion.”88 These features are inef-
fective board oversight, incentive-based compensation arrangements, 
and the transient nature of the banking industry’s workforce.89 
While Skinner focuses on fraudulent and illegal conduct, she 
readily acknowledges that much of the risk-taking behavior that 
led to the financial crisis “may not have been illegal.”90 Another 
scholar has concluded that “financial crises result from everyday 
activities performed by large swathes of the financial industry in 
an attempt to maximize short-term profits ... [and these activities 
are] rarely dishonest or sensational.”91 Consequently, the term “mis-
conduct” incorrectly implies that all of the undesirable executive 
and corporate behaviors Skinner describes are proscribed.92 To the 
contrary, the causes and effects Skinner describes apply to infor-
mation distortion more broadly: intentional and unintentional, le-
gal and illegal.93 When viewed this way, Skinner’s framework can 
demonstrate that incentive-based compensation not only encourages 
executives to make risky business decisions but also rewards the 
manipulation and distortion of information about a firm’s value and 
performance.94 Because information distortion obstructs corporate 
oversight, contagion factors can cause the risk-taking behavior to 
spread until it becomes systemic.95 Who is best positioned to detect 
and counteract information distortion before it becomes systemic? 
                                                                                                            
87 Christina Paragon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 
1562 (2016). 
88 Id. at 1563. 
89 Id. at 1563, 1577, 1580–84. 
90 Id. at 1570. 
91 Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 861, 863 (2015). 
92 Skinner, supra note 87, at 1570–72. 
93 Id. at 1580–81. 
94 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory 
of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social 
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 108 (1997) (arguing that optimistic cognitive 
biases and executives’ cognitive “perceptual filters” lead to distortion in infor-
mation flow and disclosure). 
95 Id. at 101–04. 
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Lawmakers, regulators, and litigants cannot predict and pre-
vent all information distortion.96 The best solution would leverage 
the knowledge and skill of market participants.97 The sophisti-
cated market participants who have the skill and knowledge to 
interpret data that might indicate a risk of information distortion 
or that would incentivize excessive risk taking, are called infor-
mation traders.98 
Information traders are one of five groups that form the capital 
market.99 Sophisticated “institutional investors, money manag-
ers, and other market professional players ... [who rely] on some sort 
of financial or business analytical products” as well as “[s]ell-side 
analysts, buy-side analysts, and independent analysts” are all con-
sidered information traders.100 Information traders are so named 
because they use information to assess the value of a market in-
strument, and they then trade when the market value doesn’t 
match—selling overvalued stocks and buying undervalued stocks.101 
Information traders help ensure market liquidity and accurate 
pricing because they affect supply and demand with their trades.102 
When information traders buy, prices rise.103 When they sell, prices 
                                                                                                            
96 See id. at 134 n.238. 
97 Skinner, supra note 87, at 1587 (“[R]egulators frequently lack the real-
time information to anticipate the types of activity that may lead to misconduct 
until significant damage is done[,]” and regulators lack executives’ “expertise 
with new or emerging financial products and strategies,” and regulators cannot 
identify where information distortion may appear); see also Allen, supra note 
91, at 921 (concluding that neither regulatory nor legal solutions are effective, 
and “the maintenance of financial stability sometimes rests on financial indus-
try participants choosing to care about the externalities of their actions”). 
98 Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L. J. 711, 714 (2006). While Goshen and Parchomovsky’s 
article focuses squarely on securities regulation alone, they recognize the close 
interplay between corporate law and securities regulation: “[T]he distinction 
between corporate law, whose goal is to reduce corporate agency costs, and se-
curities regulation, the goal of which is to facilitate a competitive market for 
analysts, is not so clear. Although the essential role of securities regulation is 
to facilitate a market for information traders, it also contains provisions that aim 
partially or wholly at improving corporate governance structure.” Id. at 751. 
99 Id. at 722 (defining the five groups as “insiders, information traders, li-
quidity traders, noise traders, and market makers”). 
100 Id. at 723. 
101 Id. at 726–27. 
102 Id. at 715. 
103 Id. at 726–27. 
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drop.104 In this manner, information traders exchange informa-
tion for profit.105 By trading on their information advantage, in-
formation traders transmit their information to the market, which 
responds by accurately adjusting the stock’s price.106 Misleading in-
formation reduces information traders’ ability to assess price-value 
deviations, and when they “take precautions to lower the risk of 
capturing price-value deviations ... their costs increase and mar-
ket efficiency declines.”107 Therefore, the easier it is for information 
traders to find accurate information, the greater their ability “to 
counter price deviations.”108 Accordingly, regulators “should strive 
to reduce the cost of gathering, verifying, and pricing information” 
through mandatory disclosure, prohibitions on fraud and misrepre-
sentation, and prohibitions on insider trading.109 
From an enforcement perspective, criminal statutes prohibiting 
insider trading, fraud, and misrepresentation address the crimi-
nal end of Posner’s spectrum of undesirable executive behavior while 
disclosure requirements, enabling information traders to quickly 
and accurately transmit to the market their qualitative judgments 
about allowable but risky behaviors, address the other end.110 
This distinction—between legal and illegal forms of risk-inducing 
behavior—maps onto Goshen and Parchomovsky’s distinction be-
tween breaches of the duty of loyalty and breaches of the duty of 
care.111 Because courts and regulators are best equipped to assess 
                                                                                                            
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 770–71. 
107 Id. at 732. 
108 Id. (citing Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic 
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 372–73, n.11 (2003)). 
109 Id. at 737. 
110 Id. at 741–42 (“[D]ue to the probabilistic nature of detecting fraud (i.e., 
the probability of detection is lower than one), criminal liability may constitute 
a better deterrent than civil liability that is based on actual damages.”) (citing 
Daniel R. Fischer & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in 
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 519–21 (1992)); see also id. at 750 
(“[C]ourts are ill-suited to handle breaches of the duty of care as identifying mis-
management requires second-guessing management’s business decisions .... 
[L]egislators have permitted corporations to exempt directors from monetary 
damages arising from a breach of their duty of care. Hence, responsibility for han-
dling breaches of the duty of care has moved away from courts to the market.”). 
111 See id. at 741–42. 
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and remedy quantifiable breaches of the duty of loyalty—manifested 
as fraud, misrepresentation, and theft—at least one scholar believes 
that disclosure requirements should be limited to readily verifiable 
data. In his view, “[m]andating the disclosure of soft, forward-looking 
information ... is wasteful because, instead of reducing management 
agency costs, these requirements aim at the elusive goal of achieving 
efficient markets through mandatory disclosure.”112 While regulators 
are indeed ineffective at analyzing this forward-looking informa-
tion, “information traders can detect and curtail mismanagement” 
and provide oversight that reduces agency costs.113 
Taken together, Posner’s theory of executive compensation, 
Skinner’s framework of information distortion, and Goshen and 
Parchomovsky’s efficiency-based regulatory structure create a co-
herent model within which to conceptualize the regulatory features 
needed to address the problems of executive compensation.114 The 
model illuminates the interplay between agency costs and infor-
mation distortion, and suggests a role for information traders: 
specifically, by actualizing outrage constraints to prevent exces-
sive executive compensation from re-emerging at the seams of the 
regulatory schema.115 
III.?IMPROVING THE RULE 
The rule should curb the quantifiable behaviors that contrib-
uted to the 2008 financial crisis and should include qualitative 
standards against which regulators can judge corporate oversight 
ex post in the event of market turbulence or material financial 
loss.116 The rule should make it more difficult for executives to 
conceal fraud, theft, and misrepresentation of market information.117 
                                                                                                            
112 Id. at 754. 
113 Id. at 753–55 (discussing Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a 
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1111 (1995)). 
114 See generally Posner, supra note 63; Skinner, supra note 87; Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 98 (outlining each framework generally). 
115 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 98, at 723–24 (describing capa-
bilities of information traders). 
116 See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37,670, 
37,712 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 275, 303) 
(“[N]on-financial performance measures play an important role in reinforcing 
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117 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 98, at 741–42. 
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The Re-Proposed Rule, by and large, does this.118 The Re-Proposed 
Rule limits the total portion of compensation that can be based on 
risk-inducing incentives; it ties incentive-based compensation to 
longer-term performance; it places a ceiling on potential incen-
tive-based earnings; it provides for downward adjustment and 
clawbacks; it prohibits many hedging behaviors; and it institutional-
izes governance mechanisms and oversight policies.119 Many of 
these requirements can be measured quantitatively for compliance, 
and—if excessive risk causes future loss—the qualitative aspects 
of the rule can be judged and analyzed ex post.120 The rule also 
grants considerable discretion to corporate boards in implementing a 
number of the rule’s key provisions.121 
However, even accepting the framework outlined above, rational 
executives will continue to seek to maximize their own income, and 
some directors, even some who are members of an independent 
compensation committee, will remain conflicted due a number of 
social and psychosocial factors.122 In a worst-case scenario, the rule 
will do little to help. 
In this worst-case scenario, institutional actors will engage in any 
of a number of behaviors to maximize executive compensation. Exec-
utives will rely on the excessive salaries paid by comparable insti-
tutions to bargain successfully for their own excessive salaries.123 
Boards may use their discretion to choose not to make downward 
adjustments in the face of excessive risk taking, forgoing an oppor-
tunity to deter others considering similarly risky behavior.124 
Boards may define “excessive” in a way that does not best represent 
shareholders’ interests.125 Institutions may camouflage a greater 
                                                                                                            
118 See generally Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 37,670. 
119 See id. at 37,730 (risk-taking), 37,734 (maximum incentive-based com-
pensation), 37,719 (long-term performance), 37,716 (clawback requirements), 
37,733 (hedging), 37,738 (governance requirements). 
120 See id. at 37,677. 
121 Id. at 37,712. 
122 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 59, at 31–34. 
123 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37,709 (noting 
that institutions may consider—among other factors—“compensation practices 
at comparable covered institutions” in deciding what constitutes “excessive” pay). 
124 Id. at 37,728. 
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percentage of the fixed portion of an executive’s compensation; insti-
tutions may also increase the total amount of incentive-based 
compensation to offset the percentage that must be deferred.126 
Executives who engage in risky behavior to remain competitive 
within an industry may negotiate for relative performance 
measures as a hedge against the risks from these industry-wide 
practices.127 If these same practices create a bubble that bursts, 
relative performance measures will mitigate a decrease in incen-
tive-based compensation (and in any potential downward adjust-
ment) since performance will remain comparable with similarly 
situated institutions.128  
If all of these behaviors combine, the rule will stretch at its 
seams. Excessive compensation will continue, just in a slightly 
mitigated form: executives will continue to manipulate short-run 
profits, albeit on a slightly longer timeline, and the risk of infor-
mation distortion will remain.129 Exacerbating these problems is 
the chance that these regulations will increase the confidence of 
information traders, who will reduce their efforts to verify some 
of the information on which they trade.130 If the information dis-
tortion risks remain, then this will reduce the efficiency with 
which price adjustments are quickly and accurately made.131 So, 
what can regulators do to improve the rule in a way that mitigates 
these problems? 
                                                                                                            
persons constitute excessive compensation that could lead to inappropriate 
risk-taking, particularly if the compensation setting process is not efficient or 
unbiased.”). 
126 Id. at 37,680 (requiring 60 percent of senior executive officers’ incentive-
based compensation must be deferred at Level 1 institutions, 50 percent for 
significant risk-takers, and 40 percent for individuals at Level 2 institutions). 
127 Gerald Garvey & Todd Milbourn, Incentive Compensation When Executives 
Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the 
Cross Section, 58 J. FIN. 1557, 1558 (2003). 
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129 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 98, at 735–36; see also Lynne 
L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 
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131 Id. 
 
262 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:241 
In 2010, three of the agencies responsible for the Re-Proposed 
Rule jointly adopted the “Guidance on Sound Incentive Compen-
sation Policies.”132 The Guidance encouraged disclosure to share-
holders: 
To help promote safety and soundness, a banking organization 
should provide an appropriate amount of information concerning 
its incentive compensation arrangements for executive and non-
executive employees and related risk-management, control, and 
governance processes to shareholders to allow them to monitor 
and, where appropriate, take actions to restrain the potential for 
such arrangements and processes to encourage employees to 
take imprudent risks. Such disclosures should include infor-
mation relevant to employees other than senior executives. The 
scope and level of the information disclosed by the organization 
should be tailored to the nature and complexity of the organi-
zation and its incentive compensation arrangements.133 
When the proposed rule was issued in 2011, this disclosure 
recommendation was softened to require only an annual report to 
regulators “disclosing the structure of its incentive-based compen-
sation arrangements that is sufficient to determine whether ... [it] 
provides covered persons with excessive compensation ... or could 
lead to material financial loss....”134 Just two months after the 
publication of the 2011 proposed rule, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision published its “Pillar 3 Disclosure Require-
ments for Remuneration,” which required institutions publicly to 
disclose substantial information about their compensation prac-
tices.135 The requirements were designed to implement the prin-
ciple that “[f]irms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely 
information about their compensation practices to facilitate con-
structive engagement by all stakeholders, including in particular 
                                                                                                            
132 See generally Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 
Red. Reg. 36,395 (issued June 25, 2016) (clarifying that the three agencies are 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Direc-
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133 Id. at 36,413. 
134 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170, 
21,176–77 (proposed April 14, 2011). 
135 See BASEL COMMITTEE, PILLAR 3, supra note 14, at 1. 
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shareholders.”136 In January of 2015, the Committee clarified and 
expounded upon the disclosure requirements.137 When the 2016 
Re-Proposed Rule was issued, it purported to have considered the 
Basel Committee’s disclosure requirements.138 
Nonetheless, the now-pending rule takes the 2011 reporting 
requirement—a weakened version of the 2010 Guidance’s disclosure 
recommendation—and replaces it with a still weaker recordkeep-
ing requirement.139 The proposal justifies this change by explain-
ing that despite the value of a reporting requirement, “the burden 
of producing [reports] would potentially be great on smaller cov-
ered institutions. Accordingly, the agencies determined not to in-
clude a requirement for covered institutions to submit annual 
narrative reports.”140 There is no explanation as to why a great 
burden on smaller institutions justifies excusing the largest insti-
tutions from such a beneficial requirement.141 The SEC already 
requires many institutions to disclose compensation and governance 
information to shareholders, including the monetized total compen-
sation paid to certain executives.142 When strengthening these very 
requirements in 2006, the SEC observed that the costs of the addi-
tional disclosures “will be borne by the companies’ shareholders. 
Based on the extensive comments we received from investors sup-
porting our proposals, strong evidence suggests that shareholders 
                                                                                                            
136 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE 
BASEL II FRAMEWORK 27 (July 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf [http:// 
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and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (issued Sept. 8, 2006) (to 
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are willing to bear these costs.”143 In effect, these comments demon-
strate a consensus between the Agencies and the public regarding 
a disclosure requirement.144 
Later, in 2009, the SEC said: 
[I]nvestors would benefit from an expanded discussion and 
analysis about how the company rewards and incentivizes its 
employees to the extent it creates risk to the company .... We be-
lieve that disclosure of a company’s overall compensation poli-
cies in certain circumstances can help investors identify whether 
the company has established a system of incentives that can 
lead to excessive or inappropriate risk taking by employees.145 
In proposing reforms to counteract excessive executive com-
pensation, Richard Posner said the “most obvious [reform] is re-
quiring publicly held corporations to disclose the full compensation of 
all senior executives, including” all perquisites “monetized where 
possible and subject to public audit.”146 He urges that his proposals 
not “be brushed aside on the ground that the costs may exceed the 
benefits when all direct and indirect consequences are considered.”147 
This entreaty now seems prescient.148 The consensus regarding com-
pensation disclosure has formed and dissolved since he published 
his suggestion.149 Nonetheless, the rule’s cursory dismissal of a re-
porting requirement is unconvincing in the face of the previous sup-
port it had, even within the agencies of jurisdiction.150 
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CONCLUSION 
When regulators finalize the Re-Proposed Rule, they should 
require Level 1 and Level 2 institutions to disclose the full annu-
alized value of key executives,151 monetized and subdivided into 
salary, benefits, incentive pay, and perquisites. In addition, exec-
utives should be required to disclose to their firm any personal 
hedging transactions, which should be included in this report. Do-
ing so will pull back the curtain on executive pay and allow the 
market—through the work of information traders—to make im-
portant qualitative judgements about corporate risk taking and 
to verify the effect of internal controls and governance measures.152 
Shareholders will be able to track the correlation between execu-
tive pay and firm performance over time to determine whether pay 
arrangements correctly have aligned executive incentives to ben-
efit shareholders. It also will function as an internal control by 
strengthening the outrage constraint. Forcing institutions to mone-
tize and disclose all forms of compensation eliminates many of the 
camouflaging behaviors typically used to avoid this constraint. 
When these complementary forces are working, executive com-
pensation will be highest when risk-taking behaviors are optimal 
for shareholders: the market will penalize pay that incentivizes 
excessive risk taking, while best practices paired with good oversight 
will create market confidence. In turn, boards will promote growth by 
increasing market confidence when they exercise the type of over-
sight that reduces information distortion risks. This complementary 
effect creates a virtuous cycle in which regulators verify compli-
ance ex post while market actors help to mitigate risk ex ante.153 
                                                                                                            
151 The disclosure requirement would not have to include all “covered per-
sons” under the Re-Proposed Rule to be effective. It could, for example, require 
the disclosure of the income of senior executive officers and significant risk-
takers who meet the relative compensation test. See id. at 37,692. 
152 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 98, at 738. 
153 See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 87, at 1587 (“One can readily see how defining 
the problem as structural is conducive to complementarity-style regulatory tools. 
Indeed, as in these other contexts, if not more so, complementarity is ideally suited 
to the problems presented by misconduct in complex financial institutions.”). 
